




















































































































































































We analyse the ability of the distance-to-default and bond spreads to signal bank fragility. We show that
both indicators are complete and unbiased and that spreads are non-linear in the probability of bank
default. We empirically test these properties in a sample of EU banks. We find leading properties for both
indicators. The distance-to-default exhibits lead times of 6 to 18 months. Spreads have signal value close
to default only, in line with the theory. We also find that implicit safety nets weaken the predictive power
of spreads. Further, the results suggest complementarity between both indicators, reducing type I errors.
We also examine the interaction of the indicators with other bank information.
JEL codes: G21, G12
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Non-technical summary
This paper examines whether forward-looking indicators of bank soundness could be
constructed using financial market data on the securities issued by banks. There is
considerable interest on the issue, since market data are available on a high frequency,
compared with profit and loss accounts and balance sheets. So far, all empirical evidence has
focused on banks’ subordinated bond spreads. In this paper, we also examine the properties of
an equity market-based indicator, the distance-to-default, and compare its properties to those
of the spread. The main contributions of the paper are (i) a theoretical examination of the
predictive properties of the two indicators, (ii) the estimation of a proportional hazard model
to test these properties, making efficient use of the information contained in the prevalence of
an indicator over time, and (iii) an explicit test for the role of the public safety net in the
information content of market indicators.
Using a standard option pricing framework, we show that the equity-based distance-to-
default and the subordinated bond spread have two highly desirable properties to be leading
indicators of bank fragility. They are complete in the sense that they reflect the three major
determinants of default risk (earnings expectations, leverage and asset risk) and unbiased in
the sense that they reflect these risks correctly. However, the theory also suggests that the two
indictors exhibit important differences in their predictive ability. In particular, we show that
the response of the spreads to an increase in default probability is non-linear, with little
response relatively far away from default and a strong reaction close to default. This also
implies that the distance-to-default should deliver an earlier signal of fragility than the spread.
In our empirical implementation, we calculate distances-to-default and subordinate debt
spreads for European banks for which suitable data is available for the period 1991-2001. For
spreads, we focus on secondary market spreads on adequately large bond issues in order to
abstract from noise due to limited liquidity. We use two different econometric models: a logit
model, which we estimate for different time horizons (3-24 months ahead of default) and a
proportional hazard model. The proportional hazard model permits conditional predictions of
failure. The conditional predictions are based on having “survived” to a certain point in time,
with a certain value of the market indicators in the previous period. Hence, the hazard model
allows analysing the importance of the persistence of the market signals. We also test the
additional information contained in market indicators compared with bank accounting
information and ratings, as well as the impact of the expectation of public support on the
signal value obtainable from the market data. In the empirical implementation we were faced
with the problem that in Europe, very few banks – formally – declare bankruptcy. However,
we circumvented this problem by using the downgrading of a bank to below C in the
Fitch/IBCA individual rating (a rating that excludes the safety net) and which is intended to
signal a material weakening in the stability of the bank. When examining the subsequent
performance of the bank, we found that in virtually all cases, either public intervention or
major restructuring took place six to twelve months after the downgrade.
Our empirical results support the theory. Both indicators are found to have predictive
power for bank fragility. Further, the spread typically only reacts quite close (3 to 6 months)
to default, whereas for the distance to default, we find predictive power as far from default as
24 months. We also find strong support for the notion that the information content of spreads
is significantly diminished in the case of banks, which markets expect to be bailed out in case
of difficulties. The equity-based distance-to-default does not appear to suffer from this
shortcoming.
As regards the relationship of the two market indicators with several other sources of
bank specific information, we find, one, that the market indicators contain additional
information versus the initial ratings, especially in the case of long leads before the events of
bank fragility. Second, our results suggest complementarity between market information and
banks’ accounting information. And third, we find evidence that the two indicators (distance-
to-default and spread) complement each other and lead to a reduction in Type I errors. We
show that this is a reflection of the different properties of the two indicators.	
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I. Introduction
From a supervisory perspective the securities issued by banks are interesting for two reasons: First,
market prices of debt and equity may increase banks’ funding cost and, therefore, induce market
discipline, which may complement traditional supervisory practices (such as capital requirements and on-
site inspections) in ensuring the safety and soundness of banks. The market may play a particularly useful
role in disciplining the risks of large, complex and internationalised banking organisations. Second,
supervisors are considering the use of market data to complement traditional balance sheet data for
assessing bank fragility. Market prices may efficiently summarise information, beyond and above that
contained in other sources. Moreover, market information is available at a very high frequency.
Supervisors could use these signals as screening devices or inputs into supervisors’ early warning models
geared at identifying banks, which should be more closely scrutinised.
2 Recently, it has also been
suggested to use subordinated debt spreads as triggers for supervisors’ disciplining action (Evanoff and
Wall 2000a, Flannery 2000).
A number of studies have analysed whether the market prices of the securities issued by banks
signal the risks incurred by them. If the prices reflect banks’ risks this is taken as evidence that markets
can indeed exert effective discipline on banks.
3 Studies using U.S. data have found that banks’
subordinated debenture spreads in the secondary market do reflect banks’ (or bank holding companies’)
risks measured through balance-sheet and other indicators (Flannery and Sorescu 1996, Jagtiani et. al.
2000, Flannery 1998, and 2000). Morgan and Stiroh (2001) find the same to hold for the debenture
spreads at issue.
  Sironi (2000) is the only study that we are aware of, which provides evidence for
European banks. He also concludes that banks’ debenture spreads at issue tend to reflect cross-sectional
differences in risk.
There is also some evidence that market signals could usefully complement supervisors’ traditional
information. Evanoff and Wall (2000b) find that subordinated debt spreads have some leading properties
over supervisory CAMEL ratings. Conversely, DeYoung et. al. (2000) observe that on-site examinations
produce information that affects the spreads. However, they find that spread changes more often reflect
anticipated supervisory responses than new information. For example, bond investors in troubled banks
react positively to increased supervisory oversight, hence substituting the market’s own discipline.
                                                     
2  Supervisory early warning models combine a set of bank-level financial indicators (balance sheet, income statement and
market indicators), as well as sometimes also other variables (e.g. macroeconomic conditions), to make a prediction about the
future state of a bank. A growing number of supervisory agencies have been experimenting with this kind of models (see Gilbert
et.al. 1999).
3  A much less researched question is whether a higher cost of funds actually discourages banks’ risk-taking. Bliss and Flannery
(2000) identify some beneficial market influences, but do not find strong evidence that equity and especially bond investors
regularly influence managerial action.	
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Finally, Berger et. al. (2000) conclude that supervisory assessments are generally less predictive of future
changes in performance than equity and bond market indicators.
Finally, others have analysed the complementary role of the information contained in market
prices vis-à-vis the information contained in rating agencies’ assessments. Rating agencies are typically
argued to be conservative and to respond mainly to risks, which have already materialised (Altman and
Saunders 2000). Hand et al. (1992) find that only unanticipated rating changes produce reaction in the US
bond or equity markets (see also Goh and Ederington 1993). Using European data, Gropp and Richards
(2001) find that banks’ bond spreads do not react to rating announcements, while the equity prices do.
In general, research has focussed on bond rather than equity market signals. This has been the
case in part because mandatory subordinated debt issuance by banks has been prominently recommended
as a new tool to discipline banks (e.g. Calomiris 1997, and Kwast et. al. 1999). The argument relies on the
conjecture that subordinated debt-holders have particularly strong incentives to monitor banks’ risks,
because they are uninsured and have junior status. In addition, signals based on equity prices are
considered to be biased, because equity-holders benefit from the upside gains that accrue from increased
risk-taking (e.g. Hancock and Kwast 2000, and Berger et. al. 2000). The relative importance of this moral
hazard problem becomes the more pronounced the closer the bank to insolvency, or the lower its charter
value (e.g. Keeley 1990, Demsetz et al. 1996, and Gropp and Vesala 2001).
However, as we will argue in this paper, there are several aspects, which suggest that equity market
signals may be attractive as monitoring devices. First, we show that unbiased equity-based fragility
indicators can be derived. Second, there is broad consensus that the equity markets are efficient in
processing available information. Empirical evidence strongly supports that equity-holders respond
rationally to news concerning: banks’ asset quality (Docking et. al 1997), risks in LDC loans (e.g.
Smirlock and Kaufold 1987, and Musumeci and Sinkey 1990), other banks’ problems (e.g. Aharoney and
Swary 1996), or rating changes (op. cit.). Third, while bond spreads are conceptually simple, their
implementation is difficult. For example, different bonds issued by the same bank may yield different
estimates of the spread (Hancock and Kwast 2000). Moreover, monitoring must concentrate on
sufficiently liquid bonds in order to eliminate liquidity premia. In the European context, the construction
of appropriate risk-free yield-curves, which is a necessary ingredient to the calculation of spreads, may
also be difficult especially for smaller countries, as further explained below.
In this paper, we first examine the properties of the market indicators in terms of their capability of
capturing the major elements affecting default probability (completeness), and their alignment with
supervisors’ interests (unbiasedness). We show that a distance-to-default measure, derived using option-
pricing theory from the equity market data, is both complete and unbiased, as are uninsured bond yield-
spreads, provided that banks’ asset value is still sufficiently high. Thus, these indicators are preferred over	
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biased direct equity price-based measures and could represent useful leading indicators of bank fragility.
The theory also suggests, however, that spreads may react only relatively late to a deterioration in the
quality of a bank.
We then empirically test banks’ distances-to-default and subordinated bond spreads in relation to
their capability of anticipating a material weakening in banks’ financial condition. We use two different
econometric models: a logit-model and a proportional hazard model. We find support in favour of using
both indicators as leading indicators of bank fragility, regardless of our econometric specification.
However, while we find robust predictive performance of the distance-to-default indicator between 6 to
18 months in advance, its predictive properties are quite poor closer to default. In contrast, subordinated
debt spreads are found to have signal value, but only close to default. This is consistent with the
predictions of theory. Our results also indicate that the subordinated debt-based signals are powerful
predictors only for smaller banks, which are generally not implicitly insured against default. In contrast
and as expected, the public safety net does not appear to affect the predictive power of the distance-to-
default. We also find evidence that the indicators provide marginally additional information relative to
balance sheet data alone in the case of distance to default and no extra information in the case of spreads.
Finally, we find support for our theoretical prediction that the two indicators together have more
discriminatory power in predicting defaults than each alone.
A key issue for this as any similar study such as this one is the definition of events of banks’ major
financial problems, as formal bank bankruptcies have been extremely rare events in Europe. The study
uses as such events down-gradings of FitchIBCA individual rating to category C or below indicating a
severe concern. This is a sensible approach, because individual ratings exclude the effect of possible
public support and focus on the true condition of the bank and, moreover, the majority of banks in our
sample received public support or experienced a major restructuring after such a down- grading. Hence,
the problems were severe enough to warrant major remedial action, even though there was no formal
bankruptcy. The robustness of this definition and its possible implications are discussed later on at length.
If anything, our approach should bias our findings against finding predictive power for the indicators.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section II examines the basic properties of the
equity and bond market indicators and frames our empirical propositions. Section III defines our sample
and the variables used in the empirical study. Section IV contains descriptive analyses of the behaviour of
the market indicators. Section V reports our econometric specifications and results. Section VI presents
some extensions and robustness checks. Finally, Section VII concludes.
II. Properties of market indicators
In order to structure the analysis of the market indicators, we introduce two basic definitions:	
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Definition 1. Completeness. An indicator of bank fragility is called complete, if it reflects three major
determinants of default risk: (i) the market value of assets (V), reflecting all relevant information about
earnings expectations; (ii) leverage (L), reflecting the contractual obligations the bank has to meet
(defined as the book value of the total debt liabilities (D) per the given value of assets (D/V)); and (iii) the
volatility of assets (σ), reflecting asset risk.























where Ind may represent any fragility indicator. The conditions require the indicator to be
decreasing in the earnings expectations, and increasing in the leverage and asset risk. Definition 1 follows
the usual approach in the commercial applications to define default risk measures (e.g. KMV Corporation,
1999). Definition 2 is more novel in this context and requires that any fragility indicator be aligned with
supervisors’ conservative perspective. Hence, we would argue that only complete and unbiased indicators
would be appropriate as early warning indicators of bank fragility, since only indicators with these two
properties would fully and appropriately reflect the elements affecting default probabilities of banks.
We use option-pricing theory and the valuation of equity and debt securities as a helpful tool to
demonstrate some key properties of market-based fragility indicators. We consider a bank liability
structure that consists of equity (E) and junior subordinated debt (J), and also some senior debt (I). This
allows us to study the properties of the subordinated debt spreads directly. At the maturity date (T),
payments can only be made to the junior claimants if the full promised payment has been made to the
senior debt-holders. To illustrate some of the basic concepts used below, suppose that the both classes of
the debt securities are discount bonds and that the promised payments (book values) are I and J,
respectively. (D = I+J) equals the total amount of debt liabilities. At the maturity date, the pay-off profile
of each security is as shown in Chart 1, depending on the asset value. To simplify notation, we assume
that time to maturity equals T at the time of valuation of the equity and debt securities.
II.A Equity-based indicators
Equity-holders have the residual claim on a firm’s assets and have limited liability. As first realised
by Merton (1977), equity can be modelled as a call option on the assets of the firm (here a bank), with a
strike price equal to the total book value of the debt (see Chart 1). Thus, option-pricing theory can be used	
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to derive the market value and volatility of assets from the observable equity value (VE) and volatility
(σE), and D. Consider the basic Black and Scholes (1972) formula, valuing equity as:
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where N represents the cumulative normal distribution, r the risk-free, interest rate, and T the time
to the maturity of the debt liabilities.
We can see from (2) that VE is complete, since market prices reflect the relevant information for
capturing default risk (V, D and σ). However, VE is increasing in σ, which violates condition (iii) in (1).
Therefore, an increase in the share price may not be consistent with a reduction in default risk.
However, as an alternative consider the negative of the distance-to-default (-DD),
4 which we derive
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V and σ are solved from the non-linear two equation system (2). DD indicates the number of
standard deviations (σ) from the default point at maturity (V = D). From (3) we can obtain a first result:
Result 1. (-DD) is a complete and unbiased indicator of bank fragility for V>V’ (given D). V’ is
defined as  T ) r 2 2 / 1 ( De + − σ .
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DD) meets all the conditions in (1) when V is sufficiently large (given the amount of debt); hence, it is unbiased for V>V’.
                                                     
4  A similar measure is the basic conceptual ingredient in the KMV Corporation’s model for estimating default risk (see KMV
Corporation 1999).	
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(-DD) is unbiased for all positive values of DD, i.e. always when above the default point, since
DD>0 when  T ) r 2 2 / 1 ( De V − > σ .
5 Hence, (-DD) is a complete and unbiased early warning indicator for all
banks, which are still solvent.
II.B Subordinated debt-based indicators
In determining the value of debt, it is important to explicitly account for subordination, since the
pay-off profile of the subordinated debt is different from the senior debt. Following Black and Cox
(1976), the observable market value of subordinated debt (VJ) can be derived as a difference between two
senior debt securities with the face values of (I+J) and I, and respective market values of (VI+J) and (VI)
(see Chart 1):
) T , , I , V ( V ) T , , J I , V ( V ) T , , D , V ( V I J I J σ σ σ − + = + .( 4 )
The value of the individual senior debt securities can be expressed using the standard Merton
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and the spread over and above the risk-free yield to maturity of the subordinated debt (S) equals y(T)-
r(T). S is equivalent to a credit risk premium, in the absence of any liquidity premia.
                                                     
5  Note that V can be somewhat less than D (V/D less than one) at the default point (DD=0) because of the drift and the interest
rate effects at the time of valuation (<T).	
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Based on (5) and (6) we can state a second result:
Result 2. S is a complete and unbiased indicator of bank fragility for V>V* (given D=I+J). V* is defined
as [] T ) r 2 2 / 1 ( 2 / 1 e ) J I ( I + − + σ .
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∂ +  Following Merton (1990), the value of a senior debt security is an increasing function
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Hence, S is unbiased for V>V* as it meets all the conditions in (1), and biased for V<V* by condition (iii).
V* is a geometric average of (I+J) and I (“adjusted” for time to maturity, drift and interest rate
effects), falling between the two face values (see Chart 1).
6 When the value of bank assets is high enough
to cover both senior and junior debt, the interests of the senior and junior debt-holders are aligned with
each other and with the interests of the supervisor. Hence, when the bank is economically solvent (and
equity has some value), the subordinated debt spread is an unbiased indicator of bank fragility. Since
banks would likely to be monitored while being still sound enough to cover all debt, the spread can
constitute a useful early indicator of deterioration in financial condition.
However, one should note that when the value of assets is lower than the threshold value V*
(which is to some extent below the total value of debt, depending on the amount of junior debt) the two
groups of debt-holders have conflicting interests. The junior claimants have interests similar to those of
                                                     
6 Note that V*<V’ as long as there is some junior debt outstanding.	
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the equity-holders to take on more asset risk, while the senior claimants’ expected pay-off is always
decreasing in risk.
7
The above investigation of the properties of the market signals is made in the context of a specific
model: normal asset value diffusion and European option type (call for equity and put for debt). Namely,
the market value of a debt instrument can also be expressed on the basis of the discounted value assuming
no default risk and the value of a put option on the firm’s assets (see Merton 1977, and Ron and Verma
1986). The widespread use of the Merton model, also to generate quantitative probability of default
estimates, speaks in favour of it. But unfortunately, the literature has not established general conditions,
under which the unbiasedness property could be established and verified for specific asset-liability
structures (e.g. for banks). Thus, the performance of the market signals is ultimately an empirical issue.
Notwithstanding this general point, the crucial feature that, say, the call option value is
(monotonically) increasing in V and decreasing in L seems to be a much more general result than the
monotonic and increasing relationship between the option value and σ in the Merton model, which
produces the often-cited equity price-bias. This result may not obtain for certain ranges of V under
different (and possibly more plausible) distributional assumptions, e.g. based on bounded returns (Bliss
2000), more complex liability structures, or under different option types, e.g. barrier options (Bergman et.
al. 1996).
8 Hence, alternative modelling assumptions would tend to question the universal biasedness of
the simple equity price-based indicators, rather than the unbiasedness of the DD or S-measures.
9
The main concern of this paper is indeed an empirical one whether complete and unbiased market
indicators (as derived from a specific model) are capable of signalling an increase in the default risk in a
timely fashion.
10 Traditional accounting measures, such as leverage ratios or earnings indicators are
generally incomplete and therefore less useful as indicators of bank fragility. Thus, the key proposition,
whose validity we test is as follows:
                                                     
7  This effect has an impact on the role of subordinated debt-holders in disciplining banks’ risk taking: the contribution can be
actually negative once the bank has entered the zone of de facto insolvency. In this zone, the sole right to approve business
policies should lie with the senior debt holders (or supervisors) in order to avoid moral hazard. Levonian (2001) also makes this
point that the incentives of the subordinated debt-holders do not always side with those of the supervisors.
8  There does not seem to be consensus about how to model the distribution of bank asset returns. Ritchken et. al. (1993) find
some consistency between the behaviour of bank equity and the outcomes from a barrier option framework.
9  The analysis also relies on the idea that asset risk can be measured by asset variance, which seems to be relatively
uncontested, while alternative approaches has also been proposed (foremost Harrison and Kreps 1979).
10  Empirical evidence has suggested that the actual spreads are higher than suggested by Merton’s model. Franks and Torous
(1989) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) argue that an additional element in the spread is the expectation that equity-holders
and other junior claimants receive in the bankruptcy settlement more than what is consistent with absolute priority. In addition,
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) suggest that debt-holders are forced to accept concessions to pay less than originally agreed
prior to formal bankruptcy proceedings. Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) incorporate this strategic debt service into an option-
pricing-based model and show that the spread-widening impact can be significant.	
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Proposition 1. The equity market-based (-DD) and the bond market-based S constitute early indicators of
a weakening in a bank’s condition.
Finally, it is of interest to study how the subordinated debt spread behaves as a function of the asset
value (or the distance-to-default) to see how the spread would be predicted to react to a deterioration in
financial condition. According to Black and Cox (1976), the subordinated debt value is an increasing and
concave function of V for V>V*, like senior debt. Hence, the spread is a convex and decreasing function
of V for V>V*. This means that the spread would remain stable and close to zero for large intervals of
changes in V and only react significantly relatively close to the default point.
11 This can be illustrated by
plotting the spread as a function of the distance-to-default (varying V, holding I,J constant), under
specific assumptions for the other parameters (see Chart 2). While the subordinated debt spread reacts
earlier and more than the senior debt spread, it moves up significantly only when DD is relatively low.
Hence, the equity-based distance-to-default measure can be expected to provide an indication of a
weakening financial condition earlier than the subordinated debt spread. This is a direct consequence of
the different pay-off structures of the equity and subordinated debt holders (for V>V*). Debt-holders care
only of the left tail of the distribution of returns, while equity-holders are interested in the whole
distribution of returns. In a nutshell, the theory predicts that the two indictors have qualitatively different
predicted properties, because the response of the spreads to an increase in default probability is non-
linear. Therefore, the distance-to-default measure would be predicted to deliver an earlier signal of
fragility than the spread. In the empirical analysis, we examine the performance of (-DD) and S with
respect to different time leads under the proposition that:
Proposition 2. The equity market-based (-DD) constitutes an earlier indicator of weakening in a bank’s
condition than S. S would react significantly only relatively close to the default point.
II.C Impact of the safety net
Following Merton 1977, the value of subordinated debt can be expressed in terms of two “no-
default-risk” values for the senior debt securities (I+J) and I and two put option values (strike prices
equalling the book values of debt as before).
 12 A put option represents the value of the limited liability,
i.e. equity-holders’ right of walking away from their debts in exchange for handing over the firm’s assets
to the creditors. In case of fully insured debt (like insured deposits), the put option component disappears,
                                                     
11 Bruche (2001) shows that the “hockey-stick” shape of the spread as a function of V can become more pronounced when one
introduces into the basic pricing model asymmetric information and investors’ co-ordination failure.
12 For  instance,  )) I ( 1 h ( VN )) I ( 2 h ( N e V e V V V e V V T ) T ( r
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and the market value of the debt equals the “no-default-risk” value (and S is zero). There is no signal of
fragility obtainable from the pricing of this debt. Hence, any market discipline requires that deposit
insurance is explicitly restricted, leaving out some creditors with their money at stake (e.g. Gropp and
Vesala 2001).
13
The literature (e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole 1993) has also examined the problem related to the
credibility of the restricted safety net. Losses from a failure of a significant bank might affect the banking
system as a whole and, hence, imply systemic risk. In this case, it might be expected that the “systemic”
banks would never be liquidated, or that the exposures of the systemically relevant debt-holders (such as
other banks) would always be covered, regardless of the features of the explicit safety net arrangements
(“too-big-to-fail”). If the implicit safety net is perceived to be unrestricted, the value of the put option is
zero, since the debt-holders would not face the risk of having to take over the assets of the bank. Thus, the
market value of debt would again be equal to the “no-default-risk” value also in this case and all
uninsured debt-based fragility indicators would be incomplete and fail to capture increased default risk.
The perceived probability of bailout will generally be less than one, since there is typically no
certainty of public support under an explicitly restricted deposit insurance system. Authorities frequently
follow a policy of constructive ambiguity in this regard. Under these circumstances debt based indicators
would have predictive power, but much less compared to a hypothetical completely uninsured case. In
this context we take the existence of positive spreads on banks’ uninsured debt issues as evidence that the
perceived probability might be indeed less than one. However, the history of bank bailouts by the
government (significant banks have not failed in Europe in recent history) suggests that spreads might
nevertheless be substantially weakened in their power to lead banking problems as compared with the
case where the absence of bailouts is fully credible. Gropp and Vesala (2001) find empirical support for
this point. Their results suggest that banks’ risk taking in Europe was reduced in response to the
introduction of explicit and restricted deposit insurance schemes. They also find evidence in favour of
that a number of banks are “too-big-to-fail”. In addition, Gropp and Richards (2001)find that banks’ bond
spreads do not appear to react to ratings announcements. Their findings could be interpreted as evidence
in favour of widespread safety nets. After an extensive sensitivity analysis, they cannot exclude the
possibility that bondholders expect to be insured against default risk in Europe.
As a rule, equity-holders are not covered even in broad-based explicit safety nets. In addition, the
existence of an implicit safety net would induce banks to take on increased leverage and asset risk, and
these risk taking incentives (moral hazard) would be the greater the more extensive the perceived safety
                                                     
13  The put option value also represents the value of the deposit insurance guarantee, since by guaranteeing the debt the
guarantor has in fact issued the put option on the assets (see Merton 1977). Hence, the deposit insurance value (VPO) could also
be used as an unbiased bank fragility indicator (see Bongini et. al. 2001) with the same characteristics as the market value of
debt-based indicators.	
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net (see Gropp and Vesala 2001, section 2). While bond market indicators would not reflect this
additional effect under a broad safety net, correctly specified equity indicators, such as (-DD) would.
Hence, we can formulate an additional proposition:
Proposition 3. If a bank were covered by an implicit or explicit partial guarantee, the bond spread, S,
would be a weaker leading indicator of bank fragility than the negative distance to default, (-DD).
Whether equity and bond markets are able to effectively process the available information and send
early signals, which are informative of banks’ default risk, is investigated below in a sample of European
banks. We evaluate the usefulness of the preferred (complete and unbiased) market indicators (-DD and
S) for this purpose (Proposition 1). We also test whether the spread reacts later than (-DD) (Proposition
2), and whether a perception of the safety net dilutes the predictive power of the bond market signals, but
leaves the equity market signals intact (Proposition 3).
III. Empirical implementation
Our data set consists of monthly observations from January 1991 to March 2001. The relatively
high frequency of the data highlights one fundamental advantage of market-based indicators relative to
balance sheet indicators. We decided to use monthly data, rather than an even higher frequency, in order
to eliminate some of the noise in daily equity and bond prices. The data set consists of those EU banks,
for which the necessary rating, equity and bond market information is available. In the sample selection
process we started from roughly 100 EU banks, which had obtained a “financial strength” rating from
Fitch/IBCA.
14 The sample size was then largely determined by the availability of market data. The two
sub-samples used in evaluating the equity and bond market signals consist of 84 and 59 banks,
respectively (see Table 1). The samples contain banks from 14 (equity sample) and 12 (bond sample) EU
countries.
III.A Measurement of bank “failures”
We were faced with the problem that no European banks formally declared bankruptcy during our
sample period. In the absence of formal bank defaults, we considered a downgrade in the Fitch/IBCA
“financial strength” to C or below as an event of materially weakened financial condition.
15 There are 25
such downgrades in the equity and 19 in the bond sub-sample, 32 in total (Table 2). We defend our
definition of bank “failure” on two grounds: First, the “financial strength rating” is designed to exclude
                                                     
14 For an explanation of a “financial strength” rating see below.
15 See Appendix 2 for the exact definitions of the Fitch/IBCA rating grades.	
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the safety net and, hence, should indicate the bank’s true financial condition. A downgrade to the level of
C or below signifies that there are significant concerns regarding profitability and asset quality,
management and earnings prospects. In particular when the rating falls to the D/E category very serious
problems are indicated, which either require or are likely to require external support. Second, in many
cases after the downgrade to C or below, public support was eventually granted or a major restructuring
was carried out to solve the problem. As detailed in Table 2, 11 banks received public support, and 8
banks underwent a major restructuring after the downgrading. The support or restructuring operations
also generally took place relatively soon after these events (6-12 months). In the remaining cases, no
public support or substantial restructuring took place. In part this is a reflection of sample truncation in
March of 2001, as 6 of the remaining 13 downgrades took place in late 2000 or early 2001 and an
eventual intervention cannot be excluded. Given that the downgrades precede the actions aimed at
resolving the problem by quite some time, we would argue that our proxy for bank failures is quite
sensible and generally should bias our results against finding predictive power of the indicators.
Our study is similar to the US studies investigating the relationship between market information
and supervisory ratings (for example Evanoff and Wall 2000b, DeYoung et. al. 2000, and Berger et. al.
2000), while we use the “individual” ratings as signals of banking problems. While we are concerned
about our relatively small sample sizes (at least in terms of number of banks, not in terms of data points;
see below) Evanoff and Wall (2000b), for example, consider 13 downgrades in supervisory CAMEL
ratings in a sample of 557 US banks, constituting the default events. Hence, compared to the previous
literature our sample appears reasonably large and fairly balanced. Further, rather than use the
Fitch/IBCA ratings, it could be argued that we should use supervisory ratings (such as CAMEL ratings)
instead. Unfortunately, we did not have access to historical supervisory information on individual banks
and, in some European countries, comparable ratings by supervisors do not exist. Clearly, the supervisory
ratings may be based on more detailed information relative to ratings by a ratings agency, including
confidential information obtained at on-site inspections, but they may also be subject to forbearance.
III.B Market indicators
We calculated the negative of the distance-to-default (-DD) for each bank in the sample and for
each time period (t) (i.e. month) using that period’s equity market data. The system of equations in (2)
was solved by using the generalised reduced gradient method to yield the values for VA and σA, entering
into the calculation of (-DD). Variable definitions are given in Table 3 and descriptive statistics in Table
4.
As to the inputs to the calculation of (-DD), we used monthly averages of the equity market
capitalisation (VE) from Datastream. The equity volatility (σE) was estimated as the standard deviation of
the daily absolute equity returns and we took the 6-month moving average (backwards) to reduce noise	
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(as e.g. in Marcus and Shaked 1984). The presumption is that the market participants do not use the very
volatile short-term estimates, but more smoothed volatility measures. This is not an efficient procedure as
it imposes the volatility to be constant (it is stochastic in Merton’s original model). However, equity
volatility is accurately estimated for a specific time interval, as long as leverage does not change
substantially over that period (see for example Bongini et. al. 2001). The total debt liabilities (VL) are
obtained from published accounts and are interpolated (using a cubic spline) to yield monthly
observations. The time to the maturing of the debt (T) was set to one year, which is the common
benchmark assumption without particular information about the maturity structure. Finally, we used the
government bond rates as the risk-free rates (r).
16 The values solved for V and σ were not sensitive to
changes in the starting values.
We largely followed convention when calculating the monthly averages of the secondary market
subordinated debt spreads (S). We used secondary market spreads, rather than those from the primary
market, as we would argue that secondary market spreads are more useful for the ongoing monitoring of
bank fragility. In the absence of mandatory issuance requirements, such as those proposed by Calomiris
(e.g. 1997), banks’ new issuance could be too infrequent, or limited to periods when pricing is relatively
advantageous. As we were concerned about too thin or illiquid bank bond markets in Europe, we only
selected bonds with an issue size of more than euro 150 million. This figure seemed the best compromise
between maintaining sample size and obtaining meaningful monthly price series from Bloomberg and
Datastream, which were our main data sources. In addition, in order to minimise noise in the data series,
we attempted to use fixed rate, straight, subordinated debt issues only. We were largely able to obtain
such bonds, but in some cases we had to permit floating rate bonds into the sample. We used the standard
Newton iterative method to calculate the bond yields to maturity.
For the larger countries, we were able to find bank bonds issued in the domestic currency, which
met our liquidity requirement. In case of smaller countries, banks more frequently issued foreign than
domestic currency-denominated bonds prior to the introduction of the euro. Hence, we largely resorted to
foreign currency issues (DM, euro, USD and in two cases, yen) and matched them to government bonds
issued in the same currency. We were able to construct risk-free yield-curves for Germany, France and
the UK and calculated spreads for banks in those countries relative to the corresponding point on those
curves. For the other smaller countries, we were unable to obtain sufficient data to construct full risk-free
yield-curves. We therefore instead matched the remaining term to maturity and the coupon of the bank
bond to a government bond issued by the government of the country of the bank’s incorporation in the
same currency.
                                                     
16  Our (-DD) measure is subject to the Black-Scholes’ assumption of a cumulative normal distribution (N) for the underlying
asset values. Aspointed out by Bliss (2000), this assumption may not hold in practice. He argues that the normal distribution does
not take into account that closer to the default point adjustment in debt liabilities will likely take place. Hence, empirically better
formulas could be found, while delivering fragility indicators with similar qualitative characteristics as the standard (-DD).	
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III.C Expectation of public support
We use the “support rating” issued by Fitch/IBCA to indicate the likelihood of public support. We
regard as cases of more likely public support the rating-grades 1 or 2 (see Appendix 2). The former grade
indicates existence of an assured legal guarantee, and the latter a bank, for which in Fitch/IBCA’s opinion
state support would be forthcoming. This could be, for example, because of the bank’s importance for the
economy. Hence, the likelihood of support could depend on the size of the institution (“too-big-to-fail”),
but a bank could be possibly “systemically” important also for other reasons. The weaker “support
ratings” (from 3 to 5) depend on the likelihood of private support from the parent organisation or owners,
rather than from public sources. The share of banks with a “support rating” of 1 or 2 is quite high (around
65% in the equity sample and 80% in the bond sample). This is not surprising, since we are considering
banks with a material securities market presence as an issuer. These banks tend to be significantly larger,
again as expected, than those with a rating of 3 to 5. Their average amount of total debt liabilities is
roughly 10 times higher.
III.D Sample Selection
Before we present the results, it may be worthwhile to examine the sample in a little more detail, in
particular with respect to sample selection issues. The first question that arises relates to the relevant
universe of banks. For the bond sample, the universe is determined by those banks in the EU that were
rated by Fitch/IBCA during the ten-year period under investigation.
17 Out of this total, those banks
remained in the sample, for which we were able to calculate bond spreads, i.e. for which sufficiently
liquid and sizeable bonds were outstanding and the data were available in Bloomberg. Hence, relative to
the universe of 103 rated banks, we were able to obtain meaningful bond price data for 59 banks. Sample
selection issues may be a problem, if the banks in sample differ in their likelihood of failure relative to
those in the universe of banks. In particular, we were concerned that we had tended to over-sample
failures. It turns out that this is not the case. The probability of failure during the sample period is around
33 percent both in the universe and in the sample. Nevertheless, the banks in the sample may differ in
other important criteria from those in the universe. For example, given our requirement that the bank must
have substantial subordinated debt outstanding, the banks in the sample may be larger than those in the
universe. This is the case, although the difference is not statistically significant. Finally, a bias may arise
due to differences in data availability of the banks in the sample. If banks that eventually fail remain in
the sample only a relatively short period of time prior to failure, the proportional hazard model may
overstate the predictive power of indicators. There could be a number of reasons for this problem. One,
                                                     
17  Clearly, this universe is substantially different from the notion of all EU banks. For small, non-traded banks,
such as savings banks or co-operative banks, the idea of the importance of market indicators is clearly not relevant. In
any event, we would argue that market indicators are precisely of most use in case of large, complex financial
institutions, because for these, balance sheet information may be more difficult to interpret.	
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given that we chose a fixed starting point for our sample (1991) and given that naturally all failed banks
drop out after failure, the time period that non-failed banks remain in the sample is longer. This by itself
should not constitute a problem for the estimation. However, if failures occur disproportionately at the
beginning of the sample period, i.e. in 1991-1994, this could result in overstating the predictive power of
our indicators in the proportional hazard model. However, the average time period in the sample for
banks, which eventually failed, is 34 months. This should give us ample data to obtain unbiased
estimates.
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In case of the stock price sample, we would argue that the relevant universe is somewhat smaller.
Again taking those banks, which had obtained a rating from Fitch/IBCA as the starting point, the universe
of banks is further reduced by banks, which are not listed at a major European stock exchange. It turns out
that this concerns 11 banks. Of the remaining 92 banks, our sample contains 83 banks. The difference of
nine banks is due to the unavailability of a stock price series in Datastream. The probability of failure in
the sample is identical to that in the universe at one third. Again, we were concerned whether we observe
the failing banks long enough to make meaningful inferences from the proportional hazard model. The
average time of banks, which eventually fail, in the stock price sample is one month longer than those in
the bond price sample, namely 35 months (non-failing banks: 73 months). Again, we feel that this should
give us sufficient data to estimate the model.
IV. Descriptive statistics
We constructed the sample for the empirical analysis as follows. For each month (t) of a
downgrading (“default”) event, we took all non-downgraded banks as a control sub-sample, and
calculated all variables for both sub-samples with specified leads of x months.
As a first cut at the data, we conducted simple mean comparison tests to assess whether (-DD) and
S are able to distinguish weaker banks within our data set. We also examined whether the indicators could
lead the downgrading events by performing the mean comparison tests for various time leads (lead times
of 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months). The results reported in Table 5 indicate that the banks that were
downgraded had a significantly higher mean value of (-DD) than the non-downgraded banks up to and
including 24 months prior to the downgrading events. We also find in the second panel that the banks that
were downgraded had higher prior spreads (S) and that the spreads of the “defaulted” banks clearly
increase as the “default” event is approached. However, the difference between “defaulted” and “non-
defaulted” banks is never statistically significant when the full sample is considered. This suggests that S
is a weaker leading indicator of bank fragility than (-DD).
                                                     
18  The average period in the sample of non-failing banks is, of course, longer with 76 months. Notice that
the maximum number of observations per bank is limited by our sampling period to 131 months.	
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The  “default” indicators reflect two factors: One, the bank’s ability to repay out of its own
resources, and, second, the government’s perceived willingness to absorb default losses on behalf of
private creditors (e.g. Flannery and Sorescu 1996). Hence, in the third panel of Table 5 we limit the
sample to those banks with a support rating of 3 or higher. We only present the t-tests up to x equal 12
months in order to maintain some sample size. Nevertheless, the figures given here should be interpreted
with care, as even so sample sizes are small. The results offer further evidence that a safety net
expectation can dilute the power of the spreads to reflect bank fragility, while there is no apparent impact
on the distances-to-default. In this limited sample, there is now a significant difference in the mean values
of S between “defaulted” and “non-defaulted” banks. Also in absolute terms, the difference in the average
spreads is now higher.
V. Empirical estimation
V.A Estimation methods
We used two different econometric models to investigate the signalling properties of the market-
based indicators of bank fragility. The first is a standard logit-model of the form:
) DI * DSUPP DI ( ] 1 STATUS Pr[ x t x t 2 x t 1 0 t − − − + + = = α α α ψ (7)
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We estimate the model for different horizons separately, i.e. we investigate the predictive power of
our two indicators 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months before the downgrading event. Generally, we would expect
the predictive power to diminish as we move further away from the event. Significant and positive
coefficients of the lagged market indicators (indicating a higher unconditional likelihood of problems
when the fragility indicators have a high value) would support the use of (-DD) or S as early indicators of
bank fragility (Proposition 1).
We created a dummy variable (DSUPP), equalling one when the Fitch/IBCA “support rating” is 1
or 2 in order to control for the government’s perceived willingness to absorb default losses and to test for
whether this dilutes the power of the market indicators. To this end, we interacted this variable with the
market indicators. A significant and negative coefficient of (DSUPP*S) and insignificant coefficient of
(DSUPP*(-DD)) would support Proposition 3. Since we use several observations for the same bank in
case the bank does not “default” during our sample period, our observations are not independent within	
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banks, while they are independent across banks. Therefore, we adjusted the standard errors using the
generalised method based on Huber (1967).
Our second model is a Cox proportional hazard model of the form:
X 2 DI 1
0 e ) t ( h ) X , DI , t ( h Β + = β ,( 8 )
where h(t,DI,X) represents the proportional hazard function, h0(t) the baseline hazard, and X some
control variables (see below). Again, we calculated robust standard errors, as we had multiple
observations per bank and used Lin and Wei’s (1989) adjustment to allow for correlation of the residuals
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where j indexes the ordered failure times t(j) (j=1,2,…D). Dj is the set of dj observations that
“default” at t(j) and Rj is the set of observations that are at risk at time t(j). The model allows for
censoring in the sense that, clearly, not all banks “default” during the sample period.
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The two models provide a robustness check whether equity and bond market indicators have
signalling property as regards bank “defaults”. In addition, they also provide insights into two distinct
questions: The logit-model permits a test of the unconditional predictive power of the indicators with
different lead-times, whereas the proportional hazard model yields estimates of the impact of the market
indicators on the conditional  probability of “defaulting”. The latter means that we obtain “default”
probabilities, conditional on surviving to a certain point in time and facing a certain (-DD) or S in the
previous period.
V.B Logit-estimation results
Table 6.A reports the results from estimating logit-models with different time-leads. An increased
(-DD) value tends to predict a greater likelihood of financial trouble. The respective coefficient is
significant at the 10%-level for the 6, 12 and 18-month leads. Hence, we find support for Proposition 1:
(-DD) appears to have predictive properties of an increased (unconditional) likelihood of bank problems
up to 18 months in advance. The coefficient ceases to be significant more than 18 months ahead of the
event. However, we found the insignificance of the coefficient of the 3-month lead somewhat puzzling.
We suspect that the reason is increased noise in the -DD measure closer to the default, as evidenced by
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the higher standard error for the 3 than the 6-month leads. It may be the case that many eventually
downgraded banks exhibit a lowering in the equity volatility just before the downgrading, which causes
the derived asset volatility measure to decrease as well, reducing the (-DD) value.
Turning back to Table 6.A., we find that the coefficient of DSUPP*(-DDt-x), measuring the impact
of the safety net, is never statistically significant. Moreover, the hypothesis that the coefficient of (-DDt-x)
is zero for the banks with a strong expectation of government support is rejected for all lead times, except
for x=24. The safety net does not appear to be important for the predictive power of the distance to
default as an indicator of bank fragility.
The results for the bond spreads, S, strongly support Proposition 1 as well (see Table 6.B). The
coefficients for lead times of up to 18 months are significant at least at the five percent level. The results
also highlight that it is important to control for the expectation of public support in case of spreads. The
coefficient of the interacted term (DSUPP*St-x) is significant and negative, and, a joint hypothesis test
reveals that the coefficient on the spread is zero for the banks with a high (a rating of 1 or 2) expectation
of public support. This finding is in contrast to the results using -DD as an indicator of bank fragility.
A convenient way to summarise the results of the logit models just described is given in Chart 3.
The chart presents the coefficients from Tables 6.A and 6.B, normalised, such that the maximum effect is
equal to one. It reveals that the maximal predictive power of spreads occurs quite shortly before default,
around 6 to 12 months before. In contrast, DD has relatively little predictive power close to the event, but
instead reaches its maximum no less than 18 months ahead of the default. These patterns correspond
closely to the theoretical predictions of the option pricing framework discussed in section II.
The results of discrete choice models may be quite sensitive to the underlying distributional
assumptions, in particular in cases where the distribution of the dependent variable is as skewed as in this
sample. Only four percent of the bond sample and three percent of the stock sample were “defaulting”
observations. As a simple robustness check, we estimated the corresponding Probit-models and found
essentially unchanged results, both in terms of magnitude and significance.
20
V.C Hazard-estimation results
Tables 7 and 8 give the hazard ratios and corresponding P-values for a model without additional
control variables for both (-DD) and S. Only (-DD) is significant (at the 5% level); both indicators have
the expected positive signs. The hazard ratios, indicating a greater conditional likelihood of “default”, are
increasing in the values of the fragility indicators, which is consistent with the logit-results.
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The tables also show the results for a test of the proportional hazard assumption (i.e. the zero-slope
test), which amounts to testing, whether the null hypothesis of a constant log hazard-function over time
holds for the individual covariates as well as globally. For (-DD), this assumption is violated. Hence, we
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where –3.2 represents 25
th percentile of the distribution of (-DD). Hence, in this specification, we
investigate whether banks with “short” distances to default are more likely to fail compared to all other
banks. We find that the indicator significantly (at the 1%-level) increases the hazard of a bank
“defaulting”, as before, and the model is no longer rejected due to the violation of the proportional hazard
assumption.
We also examined the weaker performance of S than -DD in the baseline specification (as given in
Tables 7 and 8). In the logit-model, we found that two factors significantly affect the predictive power of
the spread: the presence of a safety net and whether or not the bank resides in the UK. Table 10 shows
that the coefficient of the spread significantly improves when controlling for the UK by means of a
dummy variable. S now is significant at the 1%-level. In addition, the dummy for the UK is significant at
the 5%-level: higher spreads in the UK are associated with a significantly lower hazard ratio, i.e. a
significantly lower likelihood of failure. For -DD the inclusion of the safety net dummy or the UK
dummy do not materially affect the results, as in the logit-specification, and are not reported here.
Further, the logit results suggested that for banks, which are likely to benefit from public support in case
of trouble, the predictive power of bond spreads is reduced to zero. This finding is confirmed in Table 11.
The most convenient way to interpret the results is to consider the Nelson-Aalen survivor functions,
which are depicted in Chart 4. The cumulative hazard functions display the probability of survival, given
that the bank survived to period t and had a fragility indicator of a certain level. For convenience of
presentation, we split the sample in those banks that have a default indicator in the top 25
th percentile and
all other banks. We can then test whether the survivor functions are significantly different and read the
difference in the “default” probability at each point in time, given that the bank survived to that point.
Using a log-rank test for both the distance-to-default and the spread, we can reject the equality of the
survivor functions for the two groups at the 5%-level. Excluding UK banks (the second part of the lower
panel in Chart 4), we can reject equality at any significance level. Note that comparing the survivor
functions with and without UK banks, excluding the UK banks results in a downward shift of both curves.
Hence, excluding UK banks, all banks with a high spread (greater than 98 basis points) fail during the
sample period. Only UK banks survive the entire sample period with a high spread. In this paper we will	
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not explore this issue further. We only conclude that a UK spread puzzle remains, which we cannot
explain.
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Even more interesting, we can immediately read off the difference in the survivor probability,
given that a bank has remained in one or the other group. For (-DD), we find no difference in the hazard
even after 2 years (24 months). Differences only arise subsequently: after 36 months, a bank which had a
(-DD) > -3.2 for that period of time has a failure probability that is 20 percentage points higher relative to
a bank that was consistently in the control group. This is consistent with the findings in the logit-model: (-
DD) is found to be an indicator, which has better leading properties for events further in the future. In
contrast, spreads react only relatively shortly before default. Given survival, spreads essentially lose all
their discriminating power after one year. The results also highlight that the prevalence of indicators
matters, which suggests that the use of hazard-models add new insights relative to standard logit-models.
Logit-models are unable to yield predictions, which are conditional on default indicators having prevailed
for periods of time.
Hence, in line with Proposition 2, the spread reacts more closely to the “default” point than (-DD).
Put differently, banks may “survive” substantially longer with a short distance-to-default, but the
likelihood of quite immediate problems is very high, if they exhibit a high spread (in our definition of 100
basis points or above). As we show in the earlier part of this paper, the strong reaction of the spreads only
close to the default point is explained by the non-linear pay-off profile of subordinated debt-holders.
Finally we present log-rank tests of the equality of survivor functions for those banks with an
implicit safety net (“support rating” of 1 or 2) in Table 12. We find that the distance to default has more
predictive power for banks, which are likely to benefit from governmental support, and little predictive
power for those that do not.
22 More importantly, Table 12 shows the importance of UK banks, as well as
the safety net for the predictive qualities of bond spreads. With UK banks included, we find only weak
discriminating power of spreads even for banks, which are not likely to receive public support in case of
problems. Without UK banks, however, we find that spreads perform significantly better in case of banks
with little or no public support, confirming our earlier results and Proposition 3.
                                                     
21   Gropp and Olters [2001] attempt an explanation using a political economy model. They argue that as the UK has a market
based financial system as opposed to continental Europe, which is bank based, a political majority to bail out banks is more
difficult to obtain in the UK. Investors, therefore, want to be compensated for this additional default risk and require higher
spreads.
22  This somewhat puzzling finding, which we would not want to over-sell, may in fact have to do with sample composition.	
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VI.  Robustness and extensions
As an extension, it is interesting to examine whether the market indicators contain information,
which is not already summarised in ratings. To this end, we controlled for the “individual rating” at the
time the market indicators were observed.  The results given in Table 13.A for the (-DD) measure are
fairly similar to those reported in Table 7.A, albeit the significance of the (-DD) indicator is somewhat
reduced. Overall, they suggest that the (-DD) indicator adds to the information obtainable from
(Fitch/IBCA) ratings and the more the longer the time leads. The results are even stronger for the spreads
(see Table 13.B). We conclude that both of the indicators analysed in this paper appear to contain
additional information from ratings, at least in terms of their ability to predict bank “failures”.
This also addresses the specific issue raised by our definition of “failures”. Namely, there is the
possibility that we would be using market indicators to predict rating down-gradings, which could be
based on the same set of information of the probability of default. However, as we find that the market
indicators contain additional information compared to prevailing ratings, this concern does not seem to be
warranted. However, even if the ratings would contain completely similar information as our market
indicators, we would find support in our standard logit and hazard models to using market indicators:
high-frequency market data has leading properties over discrete bank problem events reflected in their
individual ratings.
We also checked whether the distance-to-default measure performs better in terms of its
(unconditional) predictive property than simpler equity-based indicators. First, we estimated the logit-
models using the equity volatility as the fragility indicator. It, however, turned out to be a significantly
weaker predictor of “default”. The coefficients of σE,t-x were never statistically significant. The composite
nature of the (-DD) apparently improves predictive performance and reduces noise. We found similar
results for a simple leverage measure (VE/ VL).
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Next, we wanted to explore whether our market indicators add information to that already available
from banks’ balance sheet. Conceptually, this is obvious: Market based indicators should fully reflect past
balance sheet information as well as forward looking expectations about the prospect of the bank. First
note that we were unable to estimate the hazard model with balance sheet variables, as they fail to be
available at a monthly frequency. Hence, we estimated logit models only.
24 Clearly, the choice of which
balance sheet variables to use is arbitrary. We followed the previous literature (see e.g. Sironi (2000),
Flannery and Sorescu (1996)) and considered a set of balance sheet indicators emulating the categories of
                                                     
23  The results are available from the authors upon request.
24  Even for the logit-models we were faced with a significant reduction in sample size. Since balance sheet data are available
only on an annual basis, we used only end-year market indicators, rather than utilising all available monthly observations with the
same horizon as in the earlier specifications.	
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CAMEL ratings (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity).
25 Then, we
calculated a composite score based on the bank’s position in each year’s distribution for every indicator.
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In this way, we were able to consider the correlation between the different indicators, i.e. whether a bank
is “strong” or “weak” by more than one indicator. In order to ensure comparability, we re-estimated the
model containing only the market indicators, in order to ensure comparability given the reduced sample
size. Second we estimated a model only with balance sheet indicators and third a model combining
market and balance sheet indicators. Here, we only report results for the 12 months time lead.
Results for the distance-to-default indicator (Table 14.A), show that it adds some information to
that already available from balance sheet data. In the model combining the distance-to-default and the
balance sheet indicators, the distance-to-default indicator is significant (at 5% level), and the model fit, as
measured by the pseudo-R
2 increases from 0.20 to 0.24 over the one containing only balance sheet
variables.
27 In addition, the significance of distance to the default indicator improves in the combined
model, when compared with the model with only the distance-to-default indicator. This suggests that the
distance-to-default indicator provides additional information to that of balance sheet variables, but it does
not replace the balance sheet indicators. In other words, the distance-to-default and the balance sheet
indicators are both useful for the monitoring of banks and play a complementary role.
Empirical estimates from the same exercise for the spreads indicator are presented in table 14.B.
They suggest that spreads also add some information to that already available from balance sheet data,
although the evidence is weaker. As before, the model combining the spreads and the balance sheet
indicators has a slightly better fit (in terms of pseudo-R
2) over the one containing only balance sheet
variables. However, by itself spreads are not significant, even for the banks that are not expected to be
supported. Our interpretation is that spreads are highly correlated with the balance sheet information and,
hence, to some extent simply appear to reflect backward looking information, rather than information
about the future performance of the bank.
Clearly, tests of the sort presented here have the drawback that they can always be criticised on the
basis of omitted variable bias, i.e. that some other balance sheet indicator may be more relevant. In order
                                                     
25  In order to maintain a sufficient sample size in the set of failed banks, we had to consider only four out of five indicators.
Hence, the liquidity indicator was taken out from the analysis.
26  The composite score is calculated in the following way:
•  We considered the percentile ranking of the bank in each year distribution for every indicator;
•  We divided the ranking distributions in four quartiles, and assigned a score varying from 0 (best) to 3 (worst) to the position
of the bank in the rankings;
•  We obtained the composite score simply summing up the scores for each indicator, yielding a variable ranging from zero (a
bank in good condition with all indicators) to 15 (a bank in bad condition with all indicators).
The FDIC uses a broadly similar approach for its CAMEL model (see FDIC (1994)).
27 The likelihood-ratio test rejects the hypothesis of no significance of the distance-to-default indicator.	
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to alleviate this criticism, we have taken care to use variables in line with the previous literature and have
also tried to emulate a CAMEL approach, which is used by many regulators. The most important result
based on this exercise may be that we find some complementarity between market and balance sheet
indicators.
Finally, we wondered whether the two market indicators might not provide complementary
information to each other. In particular, in the previous section, we demonstrated that the two indicators
have very different predictive properties through time. Spreads react late, but lose predictive power
further away from the event. The distance to default is not a very strong indicator close to default, but has
strong leading properties around two years out.
28 Table 15 gives the results from a model with both
indicators included simultaneously. We find that both variables are significant at least at the 5 percent
level.
Based on this finding, we can ask two further questions. One, which combination of spread and
distance to default gives us the most discriminatory power? And, second, is this an improvement over
using one or the other indicator alone? In Chart 5 we attempt to shed some light on both questions. In the
top panel we have given the survivor functions for banks, which are above the median in at least one of
the indicators and are in the top 75
th percentile in the other versus all other banks. We find that the
survivor functions are not significantly different from one another. In the bottom panel, we have plotted
the survivor functions for banks that are above the median in both indicators versus all other banks. Now
the survivor functions are statistically significantly different at the 5 percent level. It turns out that the
“above median in both indicators” criterion gives us maximal discriminatory power.
Further, comparing the lower panel of Chart 5 to Chart 4, we find that the combination of both
indicators provides us with better discriminatory power than either indicator alone. In comparison to the
distance to default (top panel of Chart 4), we have significantly more discriminatory power closer to the
default, which we would attribute to the addition of information contained in spreads. Looking at the
lower panel of Chart 4, we find that the addition of information contained in the distance to default to
spreads, reduces type one error dramatically. We are missing significantly fewer defaults, when using a
combination of both indicators, which is evident from the much flatter curvature of the top line in Chart 5
compared to Chart 4 (lower panel). Overall, we conclude that the market indicators appear to provide
useful information not only relative to balance sheet information and ratings, but also to each other.
                                                     
28  The simple correlation coefficient between the spread and the distance to default is -0.034, in itself suggesting that the two
indicators measure different things. Note also that the sample sizes in Table 15 are reduced somewhat relative to earlier models,
as they contain only those observations with both bond and stock market data during the same period.	
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VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we present evidence in favour of using market price based measures as early
indicators of bank fragility. We first argue that sensible indicators of bank fragility should be both
complete, in that they should reflect all potential sources of default risk, and unbiased, in that they should
reflect these risks correctly. We then demonstrated that it is possible to derive indicators satisfying both
qualities from equity and as well as from debt prices. We find that the negative distance to default is a
preferred indicator over other equity price-based indicators, since it is unbiased in the sense that it will
correctly flag an increase in asset volatility. The standard bond spread also satisfies our conditions. We
show that both indicators perform quite well as leading indicators for bank fragility in a sample of EU
banks. Due to the absence of banks declaring formal bankruptcy, we measured a bank “failure” as a
downgrading in the Fitch/IBCA “financial strength rating” to C or below. We argue that this measure of
bank fragility may be sensible as in virtually all cases there was government support or a major
restructuring in the wake of the event.
Specifically, we estimate both a logit and a proportional hazard model. The logit-model estimates
suggest that both bond spreads and distance-to-defaults have predictive power up to 18 months in advance
of the event. This was corroborated by the estimates obtained using the hazard model. The results,
however, also point towards significant differences between the two indicators. One, the negative distance
to default exhibits poor predictive power close to the event. Similarly, our results show that banks might
“survive” relatively long periods of time with short distances-to-default. In contrast, bond spreads have a
tendency to only react close to the default, i.e. they only react when the situation of the bank has already
become quite desperate. This implies that banks tend to survive only relatively short periods of time with
high spreads. These findings are consistent with the theoretical properties of the respective indicators,
which we analyse in an option pricing framework. Second, we present some evidence that bond spreads
predict financial difficulties only in the case of (smaller) banks, which do not enjoy from a stronger
expectation of a public bailout. We measured this expectation in terms of the “support rating”, indicating
the likelihood of public intervention. The equity-based distance-to-default measure was not found
sensitive to the expectation of an implicit safety net, which is in line with our priors. Finally, we
demonstrate that, given the different properties of the bond and equity based indicators, they also provide
complimentary information to each other, in particular with respect to reducing type I errors.
We interpret our findings in a way to suggest that supervisors (and possibly the literature) may
want to devote more attention to the equity market when considering the use of the information embedded
in the market prices of the securities issued by banks. Equity market data could provide supervisors with
useful complementary information. The information may be complimentary both with respect to balance
sheet data, as well as with respect to bond based market indicators.	
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As an important caveat, it is important to stress that there might be considerable practical
difficulties in using either of the indicators proposed in this paper. For example, the distance-to-default
measure, apart from its relative computational complexity, may be sensitive to shifts in derived asset
volatility. This, in turn, may be due to irregularities in the equity trading in the period closer to default.
Further, the measure is quite sensitive to the measure of equity volatility used and distributional
assumptions about equity returns. Similarly, the calculation of bond spreads may be difficult in practice,
because of relatively illiquid bond markets, resulting in noisy price data for bank bonds and the lack of
reliable risk-free benchmarks (especially in smaller countries).	
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Table 1.
Composition of the banks by country and availability of equity and bond data
Equity Bond Equity Bond
Belgium 4 1 Italy 20 7
Denmark 2 Netherlands 3 4
Germany 10 16 Austria 3 2
Greece 3 Portugal 4 1
Spain 7 2 Finland 1 2
France 8 9 Sweden 3 3




Downgrading events (to a “individual rating” C or below) in the sample
Bank Downgrading Support / restructuring /
other
Timing
A. Cases of public support
Banco Espanol de Credito** June 93 Public financial support Dec. 93
Banco di Napoli** Jan. 95 Public capital injection Early-96
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro June 97 Public capital support in the form of
a transfer of Artigiancassa
During 96
Bankgesellschaft Berlin June 99 Re-capitalisation (partly
government owned bank)
During 01
CPR Nov. 98 Support from the parent group (CA) End-98
Credit Lyonnais* June 94 Public financial support Spring 95
Credit Foncier de France First rating (D) April 00 Public financial support April 96
Erste Bank der Oesterreichischen
Sparkassen
Feb. 00 Capital injection (from the savings
banks’ system)
Oct. 00
Okobank Oct. 94 Public capital injection Oct.93-end. 95
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken July 92 Government guarantee Dec. 92
Svenska Handelsbanken Dec. 92 Government guarantee Dec. 92
B. Cases of substantial
restructuring
Banca Popolare di Novara** Oct. 95 Major restructuring, e.g. new
management
During 96
Bank Austria June 96 Absorbed by West-Deutsche LB May 97
Banque Natexis Nov. 96 Merger (Credit National and
Banque Federal de BP)
Jan. 97
Banque Worms Nov. 99 Sold to Deutsche Bank Oct. 00
CIC Group Aug. 95 Fully privatised During 96
Commercial Bank of Greece Dec. 98 Sale of significant parts of
operations (Ionian and Popular
Bank)
Early-99
Entenial March 99 Merger with Banque La Hénin-
Epargne Crédit (BLH).
Creditanstalt Jan. 97 Take-over by Bank Austria Jan. 97	
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C. Other cases
Banca Commerciale Italiana June 00 Weak performance and asset quality
Banca di Roma Nov. 96 Depressed profitability  and asset
quality e.g. due to several
acquisitions
Banca Popolare di Intra** Feb. 01 Weak performance and asset quality
Banca Popolare di Lodi June 00 Weak performance and asset quality
Banca Popolare di Milano** Nov. 95 Weak performance and asset quality
Banca Popolare di Sondrio** March 00 Weak performance and asset quality
Banco Zaragozano** March 95 Weak performance and asset quality
Bayerische Landesbank* Dec. 99 Weak capital adequacy and asset
quality
Credito Valtellinese Feb. 01 Weak performance and asset quality
Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank* Nov. 00 Weak performance and asset quality
HSBC Bank* May 91 Weak performance and asset quality
Standard Chartered* June 90 Weak performance and asset quality
Westdeutsche Landesbank* Nov 98 Exposures to Russia, weak
capitalisation




Market value of equity (VE) Monthly average equity market capitalisation (millions of euro)
(TXLW\￿YRODWLOLW\￿￿ E) 6-month moving average (backwards) of daily absolute equity returns (%)
Book value of debt liabilities (D) Total debt liabilities (interpolated monthly observations) (millions of euro)
Market value of assets (V) Derived (equations (2)) monthly average of the total asset value (millions of
euro)
9RODWLOLW\￿RI￿DVVHWV￿￿ ) Derived (equations (2)) monthly estimate of the asset value volatility (%)
Negative of the distance-to-default (-DD) Monthly average (-DD) calculated from VA￿￿ A, and VL(equation (3))
Spread (S) Calculated monthly average subordinated debt spread of the yield to maturity
over the risk-free yield to maturity
Dummy indicating expected public support (DSUPP) Dummy variable equalling one if Fitch/IBCA support rating 1 or 2 (zero
otherwise)
Status variable (STATUS) Binary variable equalling one if a bank experiences a downgrading in




Variable t-x Nobs Mean Std.dev Min Max
1
x = 3 months 1043 10,212 17,452 13.64 191,638
x = 6 months 1043 10,047 17,305 11.80 229,167
x = 12 months 1040 9,043 15,597 13.79 183,195
x = 18 months 1039 8,363 14,509 13.64 129,555
Market value of equity (VE)
(millions of euros)
x = 24 months 1036 7,377 13,226 11.84 104,839
x = 3 months 1043 0.27 0.14 0.01 2.01
x = 6 months 1043 0.27 0.14 0.01 2.01
x = 12 months 1040 0.28 0.14 0.01 0.71
x = 18 months 1039 0.27 0.15 0.01 2.06
(TXLW\￿YRODWLOLW\￿￿ E)
x = 24 months 1036 0.25 0.14 0.01 2.06
x = 3 months 1043 94,862 117,375 464.95 715,825
x = 6 months 1043 91,921 113,277 441.31 688,596
x = 12 months 1040 86,908 106,286 397.59 636,515
x = 18 months 1039 82,799 100,645 358.20 556,785
Book value of debt liabilities
(D)
(millions of euros)
x = 24 months 1036 79,308 95,969 305.34 490,866
x = 3 months 1043 99,500 120,350 568.99 735,885
x = 6 months 1043 96,617 116,403 519.16 710,957
x = 12 months 1040 90,818 108,557 484.66 652,365
x = 18 months 1039 85,963 102,492 365.65 569,511
Market value of assets (V)
(millions of euros)
x = 24 months 1036 81,478 96,825 312.37 499,827
x = 3 months 1043 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.65
x = 6 months 1043 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.65
x = 12 months 1040 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.28
x = 18 months 1039 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.73
9RODWLOLW\￿RI￿DVVHWV￿￿ )
x = 24 months 1036 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.73
x = 3 months 1043 -5.64 6.00 -87.71 0.99
x = 6 months 1043 -5.60 5.71 -91.12 0.99
x = 12 months 1040 -5.28 5.01 -71.71 -1.20
x = 18 months 1039 -5.62 6.57 -133.89 1.05
Negative of the distance-to-
default (-DD)
x = 24 months 1036 -5.90 6.46 -130.44 1.05
x = 3 months 478 0.89 1.14 -0.49 6.02
x = 6 months 474 0.87 1.15 -0.40 6.08
x = 12 months 457 0.79 1.04 -0.27 6.07
x = 18 months 432 0.75 1.04 -0.82 6.32
Spread (S) (%)
x = 24 months 407 0.70 1.06 -0.62 6.23
1) The large max values for equity and asset volatility are due to Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna, which had very high
volatility levels from December 1996 until May 1997. This observation was not found to affect the econometric results.	
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Table 5.
Ability of (-DD) and S to distinguish weaker banks: mean value tests, all banks
Two sub-sample t-tests (unequal variances) are reported for the difference in mean values of (-DDt-x) and St-x in the sub-samples of
downgraded (SATUS=1) and non-downgraded banks (STATUS=0). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Status Nobs Mean Std. error Difference
(1 Difference < 0
(2
Equity (-DDt-x)
x = 3 months 0 1018 -5.68 0.19 -1.58 -3.490***
1 25 -4.10 0.41
x = 6 months 0 1018 -5.64 0.18 -1.79 -5.335***
1 25 -3.85 0.28
x = 12 months 0 1018 -5.31 0.16 -1.62 -4.887***
1 22 -3.69 0.29
x = 18 months 0 1018 -5.66 0.21 -1.93 -5.181***
1 21 -3.72 0.31
x = 24 months 0 1018 -5.93 0.20 -1.55 -2.823***
1 18 -4.38 0.51
Bond St-x
x = 3 months 0 457 0.88 0.05 -0.19 -0.68
1 21 1.07 0.27
x = 6 months 0 454 0.86 0.05 -0.18 -0.55
1 20 1.04 0.32
x = 12 months 0 438 0.79 0.05 -0.10 -0.37
1 19 0.89 0.26
x = 18 months 0 417 0.74 0.05 -0.12 -0.43
1 15 0.86 0.27
x = 24 months 0 393 0.70 0.05 -0.03 -0.13
1 14 0.73 0.26
Bond
(3 St-x
x = 3 months 0 78 0.24 0.02 -0.55 -1.997**
1 5 0.79 0.25
x = 6 months 0 72 0.22 0.02 -0.36 -2.90**
1 5 0.58 0.12
x = 12 months 0 67 0.22 0.02 -0.38 -1.556*
1 4 0.60 0.25
1) Mean (STATUS=0) – Mean (SATUS=1). 2) t-statistics for testing the hypothesis that Difference is negative. 3) Banks with low
public support expectation and excluding UK banks.	
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Table 6.A
Predictive performance of the distance-to-default indicator: logit-estimations, all banks
All models are estimated using the binary variable STATUS as the dependent variable. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
x =3 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -2.803*** 0.454 -6.170 0.000
(-DDt-3) 0.113 0.091 1.240 0.216
DSUPP*(-DDt-3) 0.158 0.105 1.510 0.130
Number of observations 1043 Log likelihood -114.35
F-test
(1 5.22** Pseudo R
2 0.0307
x =6 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -2.620*** 0.440 -5.950 0.000
(-DDt-6) 0.182* 0.096 1.890 0.058
DSUPP*(-DDt-6) 0.112 0.109 1.030 0.302
Number of observations 1043 Log likelihood -114.04
F-test
(1 6.44** Pseudo R
2 0.0333
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -2.889*** 0.451 -6.400 0.000
(-DDt-12) 0.212** 0.105 2.030 0.043
DSUPP*(-DDt-12) 0.018 0.117 0.150 0.880
Number of observations 1040 Log likelihood -103.96
F-test
(1 3.78** Pseudo R
2 0.0247
x =18 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -2.686*** 0.541 -4.960 0.000
(-DDt-18) 0.287* 0.149 1.920 0.054
DSUPP*(-DDt-18) -0.014 0.126 -0.110 0.913
Number of observations 1039 Log likelihood -102.742
F-test
(1 4.29** Pseudo R
2 0.0322
x =24 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -3.301*** 0.594 -5.560 0.000
(-DDt-24) 0.171 0.130 1.320 0.188
DSUPP*(-DDt-24) -0.034 0.113 -0.300 0.761
Number of observations 1036 Log likelihood -89.315
F-test
(1 1.11 Pseudo R
2 0.0163
1) F-test for the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of (-DDt-x) and DSUPP*(-DDt-x) is zero (i.e. that the coefficient of (-DDt-x)
is zero for banks with a greater expectation of public support). χ
2 values reported.  2) Standard errors adjusted.	
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Table 6.B
Predictive performance of the spread indicator: logit-estimations, all banks
All models are estimated using the binary variable STATUS as the dependent variable and excluding UK banks.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
x = 3 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -3.361*** 0.387 -8.680 0.000
(St-3) 2.838*** 1.120 2.530 0.010
DSUPP*(St-3) -2.546** 1.100 -2.310 0.021
Number of observations 364 Log likelihood -69.854
F-test
(1 1.41 Pseudo R
2 0.064
x = 6 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -3.497*** 0.421 -8.300 0.000
(St-6) 4.073*** 1.555 2.620 0.009
DSUPP*(St-6) -3.745*** 1.513 -2.480 0.010
Number of observations 361 Log likelihood -66.464
F-test
(1 1.86 Pseudo R
2 0.071
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -3.416*** 0.402 -8.500 0.000
(St-12) 3.186** 1.311 2.430 0.015
DSUPP*(St-12) -2.781** 1.286 -2.160 0.031
Number of observations 348 Log likelihood -64.379
F-test
(1 2.09 Pseudo R
2 0.052
x =18 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -3.528*** 0.437 -8.070 0.000
(St-18) 2.706** 1.112 2.430 0.015
DSUPP*(St-18) -2.402** 1.088 -2.210 0.027
Number of observations 328 Log likelihood -52.302
F-test
(1 0.67 Pseudo R
2 0.044
x =24 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 Z P>z 
Constant -3.433 0.470 -7.300 0.000
(St-24) 2.305 2.280 1.010 0.312
DSUPP*(St-24) -2.062 2.194 -0.940 0.347
Number of observations 310 Log likelihood -50.013
F-test
(1 0.29 Pseudo R
2 0.015
1) F-test for the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of (St-x) and DSUPP*(St-x) is zero (i.e. the coefficient of (St-x) is zero for
banks with a greater expectation of public support). χ
2 values reported. 2) Standard errors adjusted.	
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Table 7.
Performance of the distance-to-default indicator: proportional hazard estimation, all banks
Estimated using Cox regression. Log-likelihood given in the text. Standard errors are corrected for clustering using Wei and
Lin’s (1989) method *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Explanatory variable Hazard ratio Robust std. error z P>z 
(-DD) 0.728** 0.115 2.02 0.04
Number of subjects 84 Time at risk 5365
Number of failures 25 Starting log likelihood -100.49
Number of observations 5365 Final log likelihood -96.71
Wald χ
2 4.08** Zero-slope test 7.66***
Table 8.
Performance of the bond spread: proportional hazard estimation, all banks
Estimated using Cox regression. Log-likelihood given in the text. Standard errors are corrected for clustering using Wei and
Lin’s (1989) method. *,**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Explanatory variable Hazard ratio Robust std. error z P>z 
S 1.00 0.002 0.75 0.455
Number of subjects 59 Time at risk 3604
Number of failures 19 Starting log likelihood -69.76
Number of observations 3604 Final log likelihood -69.54
Wald χ
2 0.56 Zero-slope test 0.40
Table 9.
Performance of the distance-to-default indicator: proportional hazard estimation using a dummy variable, all
banks
Estimated using Cox regression. Log-likelihood given in the text. Standard errors are corrected for clustering using Wei and
Lin’s (1989) method. *,**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Explanatory variable Hazard ratio Robust std. error z P>z 
Dummy for (-DD) >-3.2 2.69*** 1.034 2.57 0.01
Number of subjects 84 Time at risk 5365
Number of failures 25 Starting log likelihood -100.49
Number of observations 5365 Final log likelihood -97.86
Wald χ
2 6.62*** Zero-slope test 1.52	
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Table 10.
Performance of the bond spread: proportional hazard estimation controlling for the UK, all banks
Estimated using Cox regression. Log-likelihood given in the text. Standard errors are corrected for clustering using Wei and
Lin’s (1989) method. *,**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Explanatory variable Hazard ratio Robust std. error z P>z 
S 1.01*** 0.002 2.74 0.006
Dummy for UK -0.065** 0.080 -2.25 0.025
Number of subjects 59 Time at risk 3604
Number of failures 19 Starting log likelihood -69.76
Number of observations 3604 Final log likelihood -65.18
Wald χ
2 8.76*** Zero-slope test (global test) 1.86
Table 11.
Performance of the bond spread: proportional hazard estimation controlling the level of support, UK banks
excluded
Estimated using Cox regression. Log-likelihood given in the text. Standard errors are corrected for clustering using Wei and
Lin’s (1989) method. *,**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Explanatory variable Hazard ratio Robust std. error z P>z 
S 1.02*** 0.005 3.79 0.000
Dummy “high support”*S -0.99*** 0.005 -2.71 0.007
Number of subjects 49 Time at risk 2720
Number of failures 18 Starting log likelihood -61.51
Number of observations 2720 Final log likelihood -57.07
Wald χ
2 16.38*** Zero-slope test (global test) 2.58
Table 12.
The role of the safety net and the UK location: Log-rank tests for equality of survivor functions, all banks
Estimated using the Cox regression in tables 9 and 11. *,**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
χ
2 P > χ
2
(-DD)
Dummy “high support” equal to 1 4.94** 0.03
Dummy “high support” equal to 0 0.90 0.34
S
Dummy “high support” equal to 1 1.95 0.16
Dummy “high support” equal to 0 3.30* 0.07
S; excluding UK banks
Dummy “high support” equal to 1 7.81*** 0.005
Dummy “high support” equal to 0 30.19*** 0.000	
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 Table 13.A
Predictive performance of the distance-to-default indicator: logit-estimations, controlling for the Fitch-IBCA
individual rating before the event
Logit-estimations are reported for the sample of downgraded and non-downgraded banks, controlling for the individual rating
before the event. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
x =6 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. Error z P>z 
Constant -3.888*** 0.709 -5.490 0.000
(-DDt-6) 0.186 0.117 1.590 0.112
DSUPP*(-DDt-6) 0.092 0.127 0.730 0.468
INDRATt-6 0.357** 0.168 2.120 0.034
Number of observations 959 Log likelihood -105.237
F-test 4.52** Pseudo R
2 0.0916
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. Error z P>z 
Constant -3.954*** 0.663 -5.960 0.000
(-DDt-12) 0.208* 0.120 1.730 0.084
DSUPP*(-DDt-12) 0.022 0.136 0.160 0.873
INDRATt-12 0.321** 0.151 2.120 0.034
Number of observations 931 Log likelihood -96.997
F-test 3.22* Pseudo R
2 0.0685
x =18 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. Error z P>z 
Constant -3.431*** 0.754 -4.550 0.000
(-DDt-18) 0.290* 0.163 1.780 0.075
DSUPP*(-DDt-18) 0.017 0.151 0.110 0.913
INDRATt-18 0.277* 0.150 1.850 0.064
Number of observations 909 Log likelihood -93.172
F-test 4.25** Pseudo R
2 0.0669
See notes in Table7.A.	
 		
Table 13.B
Predictive performance of the spread indicator: logit-estimations, controlling for the Fitch-IBCA individual
rating before the event
Logit-estimations are reported for the sample of downgraded and non-downgraded banks, controlling for the individual rating
before the event and excluding UK banks. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
x =3 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error z P>z 
Constant -9.659** 3.954 -2.440 0.015
(St-3) 2.277*** 0.797 2.860 0.004
DSUPP*(St-3) -1.994*** 0.747 -2.670 0.008
INDRATt-6 1.610 1.015 1.590 0.113
Number of observations 305 Log likelihood -36.639
F-test
(1 1.48 Pseudo R
2 0.355
x =6 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error z P>z 
Constant -8.366*** 2.990 -2.800 0.005
(St-6) 3.364** 1.555 2.160 0.030
DSUPP*(St-6) -3.068** 1.458 -2.100 0.035
INDRATt-6 1.253 0.809 1.550 0.122
Number of observations 295 Log likelihood -36.458
F-test
(1 1.38 Pseudo R
2 0.316
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error z P>z 
Constant -7.837*** 2.874 -2.730 0.006
(St-12) 3.078*** 1.169 2.630 0.008
DSUPP*(St-12) -2.790*** 1.092 -2.560 0.010
INDRATt-12 1.158 0.810 1.430 0.153
Number of observations 283 Log likelihood -35.293
F-test
(1 0.62 Pseudo R
2 0.283
See notes in Table7.B.	
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Table 14.A
Information content of the distance-to-default indicator: logit-estimations, all banks
All models are estimated using the binary variable STATUS as the dependent variable. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. SCORE is a synthetic variable summarising the ranking of the
bank with regard to four indicators representing respectively capital adequacy, asset quality, efficiency, and profitability.
Model with only the distance-to-default indicator
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 Z P>z 
Constant -1.790*** 0.492 -3.640 0.000
(DDt-x) 0.249** 0.121 2.070 0.039
DSUPP*(DDt-x) 0.005 0.119 0.040 0.970
Number of observations 408 Log likelihood -82.626
F-test
(1 3.97** Pseudo R
2 0.035
Model with only balance-sheet indicators
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 Z P>z 
Constant -7.105*** 1.082 -6.570 0.000
SCORE 0.574*** 0.121 4.740 0.000
Number of observations 408 Log likelihood -68.588
Pseudo R
2 0.199
Model with the distance-to-default indicator and balance-sheet indicators
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 Z P>z 
Constant -6.232*** 1.155 -5.390 0.000
(DDt-x) 0.242** 0.110 2.200 0.028
DSUPP*(DDt-x) -0.044 0.127 -0.340 0.732
SCORE 0.585*** 0.125 4.670 0.000
Number of observations 408 Log likelihood -65.360
F-test
(1 3.03* Pseudo R
2 0.238
See notes in Table7.B.	
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Table 14.B
Information content of the spreads indicator: logit-estimations, all banks
All models are estimated using the binary variable STATUS as the dependent variable. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. SCORE is a synthetic variable summarising the ranking of the
bank with regard to four indicators representing respectively capital adequacy, asset quality, efficiency, and profitability.
The models exclude UK banks.
Model with only the spreads indicator
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -2.451*** 0.405 -6.060 0.000
(St-x) 2.999** 1.353 2.220 0.027
DSUPP*(St-x) -2.575* 1.328 -1.940 0.053




Model with only balance-sheet indicators
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -6.272*** 1.269 -4.940 0.000
SCORE 0.548*** 0.142 3.850 0.000
Number of observations 144 Log likelihood -40.260
Pseudo-R
2 0.230
Model with the spreads indicator and balance-sheet indicators
x =12 months
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust std. error
(2 z P>z 
Constant -6.305*** 1.233 -5.110 0.000
(St-x) 2.079 1.627 1.280 0.201
DSUPP*(St-x) -1.662 1.600 -1.040 0.299
SCORE 0.514*** 0.138 3.730 0.000
Number of observations 144 Log likelihood -39.136
Pseudo-R
2 0.251
See notes in Table7.B.	
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Table 15.
Performance of the distance to default and the bond spread: proportional hazard estimation, UK banks
excluded
Estimated using Cox regression. Log-likelihood given in the text. Standard errors are corrected for clustering using Wei and
Lin’s (1989) method. *,**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Explanatory variable Hazard ratio Robust std. error z P>z 
Dummy for (-DD) >-3.2 4.01** 2.55 2.19 0.029
S 1.01*** 0.004 2.77 0.006
Dummy “high support”*S -0.99** 0.005 -2.41 0.016
Number of subjects 34 Time at risk 1494
Number of failures 10 Starting log likelihood -31.17
Number of observations 1494 Final log likelihood -27.94
Wald χ
2 12.90*** Zero-slope test (global test) 2.65	
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Senior debt V I I
Chart 2. Predicted spread (Black-Cox) (% of face value) as a function of distance-to-default
Subordinated debt (solid line), senior debt (dashed line)



















































Chart 3. Summary of Logit-estimation results
The chart displays the pattern of coefficients on the two indicators from Tables 6.A. and 6.B. with different
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Survivor functions for the distance-to-default and spread
A. Distance-to-default
ddindum=1 if (–DD) > -3.2 and 0 otherwise. Analysis time is measured in months. Log-rank test for equality (χ
2 distributed) is equal to 6.08,
which rejects equality at the 5%-level.
B. Spreads
spinddum=1 if S>98 basis points and 0 otherwise. Panel B excludes UK banks. Analysis time is measured in months. Log-rank test for equality
(χ
2 distributed) is equal to 4.73 and 25.9, respectively. Equality is rejected at the 5 percent (with UK banks) and at any significance level (without
UK banks.
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by ddindum
 
analysis time








Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by spinddum
 
analysis time





















Survivor functions for the distance-to-default and spread, both indicators in the same model
At least one of the two indicators in top half and the other in top 75
th percentile. Survival functions are not statistically significantly different (Chi
squared of 1.04).
Both indicators in top half of the respective distributions. Survival functions are statistically significantly different at the 5 percent level (Chi
squared of 4.1).
























Distance-to-default according to the Black and Scholes formula
29
In the BS model the time path of the market value of assets follows a stochastic process:
, T T
2
















which gives the asset value at time T (i.e. maturity of debt), given its current value (VA is the random component
of the firm’s return on assets, which the BS model assumes normally distributed, with zero mean and unit variance,
N(0,1).
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		 A) that the firm is from the default point.
The implied probability of default (IPD) can be defined as the probability that the asset value is less or equal to the
book value of debt liabilities when the debt matures:
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29   See KMV Corporation (1999) for a similar derivation and more ample discussions.	
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Appendix 2.
Ratings definitions used by Fitch-IBCA
Fitch-IBCA’s Individual Ratings attempt to assess how a bank would be viewed if it were entirely
independent, and could not rely on external support. These ratings are designed to assess a bank’s exposure to,
appetite for, and management of risk, and thus represent the view on the likelihood that it would run into significant
difficulties. The principal factors analysed to evaluate the bank and determine these ratings include profitability and
balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment, and prospects.
Fitch-IBCA distinguishes among the following categories:
A.  A very strong bank. Characteristics may include outstanding profitability and balance sheet integrity,
franchise, management, operating environment, or prospects.
B.  A strong bank. There are no major concerns regarding the bank. Characteristics may include strong
profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects.
C.  An adequate bank which, however, possesses one or more troublesome aspects. There may be
some concerns regarding its profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating
environment or prospects.
D.  A bank which has weaknesses of internal and/or external origin. There are concerns regarding its
profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects.
E.  A bank with very serious problems which either requires or is likely to require external support.
Note that, in addition, there are gradations among these five rating categories, i.e. A/B, B/C, C/D, and D/E.
The Support Ratings do not assess the quality of a bank. Rather, they are Fitch-IBCA’s assessment of
whether the bank would receive support should this be necessary.
1.  A bank for which there is a clear legal guarantee on the part of the State, or a bank of such importance
both internationally and domestically that, in Fitch-IBCA’s opinion, support from the State would be
forthcoming, if necessary. The State in question must clearly be prepared and able to support its
principal banks.
2.  A bank for which, in our opinion, state support would be forthcoming, even in the absence of a legal
guarantee. This could be, for example, because of the bank’s importance to the economy or its historic
relationship with the authorities.
3.  A bank or bank holding company which has institutional owners of sufficient reputation and possessing
such resources that, in our opinion, support would be forthcoming, if necessary.
4.  A bank for which support is likely but not certain.
A bank, or bank holding company, for which support, although possible, cannot be relied upon.	
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